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 Abstract 
Typical adults can track reward probabilities across trials to estimate the volatility of the 
environment and use this information to modify their learning rate (Behrens et al., 2007). In a 
stable environment, it is advantageous to take account of outcomes over many trials, whereas 
in a volatile environment, recent experience should be more strongly weighted than distant 
experience. Recent predictive coding accounts of autism propose that autistic individuals will 
demonstrate atypical updating of their behaviour in response to the statistics of the reward 
environment. To rigorously test this hypothesis, we administered a developmentally 
appropriate version of Behrens et al.’s (2007) task to 34 cognitively able children on the 
autism spectrum aged between 6 and 14 years, 32 age- and ability-matched typically 
developing children and 19 typical adults. Participants were required to choose between a 
green and a blue pirate chest, each associated with a randomly determined reward value 
between 0 and 100 points, with a combined total of 100 points. On each trial, the reward was 
given for one stimulus only. In the stable condition, the ratio of the blue or green response 
being rewarded was fixed at 75:25. In the volatile condition, the ratio alternated between 
80:20 and 20:80 every 20 trials. We estimated the learning rate for each participant by fitting 
a delta rule model and compared this rate across conditions and groups. All groups increased 
their learning rate in the volatile condition compared to the stable condition. Unexpectedly, 
there was no effect of group and no interaction between group and condition. Thus, autistic 
children used information about the statistics of the reward environment to guide their 
decisions to a similar extent as typically developing children and adults. These results help 
constrain predictive coding accounts of autism by demonstrating that autism is not 
characterized by uniform differences in the weighting of prediction error. 
  
 
 
 Research highlights 
• Predictive coding models have recently been proposed to account for the complex autism 
phenotype. 
• Here, we test a key prediction from predictive coding accounts using a probabilistic learning 
task. 
• Autistic children did not have generally elevated learning rates compared to typically 
developing children, and updated their learning rate in a volatile 
reward environment. 
• These results suggest that autism is not characterized by uniformly high and inflexible 
weighting of prediction errors. 
 
Introduction 
 The decisions we make in a given moment are informed by expectations derived from 
the outcomes of similar decisions we have made in the past (Behrens et al., 2007; Louie & 
Glimcher, 2012; Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015). Rather than assigning equal weight to all 
previous outcomes, neurotypical adults can track the statistics of the environment in order to 
determine how much weight should be given to new information. When the reward 
environment is stable, people take account of previous outcomes over many trials to guide 
their decisions (Behrens et al., 2007; O’Reilly, 2013).  Yet, when the reward environment is 
volatile (i.e., fluctuating over blocks of trials), people weight their recent experience more 
strongly than their distant experience (Behrens et al., 2007). The relative weighting given to 
recent and distant trials is reflected in a person’s learning rate (Dayan et al., 2000). In a stable 
environment, neurotypical adults demonstrate a low learning rate (Behrens et al., 2007), as 
the history of outcomes is more predictive of the current state of the environment than the 
outcomes in the most recent trials.  In a volatile environment, adults demonstrate an increased 
 learning rate, whereby they ‘take notice’ of the outcomes of more recent trials and use these 
to modify their behaviour (Behrens et al., 2007). 
The ability to take account of previous information has been the focus of recent 
advances in theories of autistic perception and cognition (see Brock, 2014, for review).  
Applying a Bayesian framework, Pellicano and Burr (2012a) suggested that autistic1 
individuals make less use of prior information than typical individuals.  Under the Bayesian 
framework, the percept (or posterior) results from a combination of incoming sensory 
information (the likelihood) and previous information (priors), the weighting of which 
depends on their respective precision.  Pellicano and Burr suggested that individuals with 
autism have attenuated (broader) priors, meaning that their perception is more dominated by 
the incoming sensory information.  While the theory initially focused on perception, the 
weaker influence of prior information could potentially account for a range of aspects of the 
autism phenotype, such as social functioning (Pellicano & Burr, 2012b). 
Elaborations of this account have used the predictive coding framework, which 
provides a biologically plausible implementation of Bayesian inference (see Clark, 2013, for 
review). According to the predictive coding approach, the brain aims to predict what will 
happen next and attempts to minimise prediction error – the discrepancy between the 
prediction and reality.  Predictions emerging from higher brain areas are used to attempt to 
‘explain away’ the input from lower brain areas and prediction errors are passed up the 
hierarchy to inform higher-level expectations. The influence of prior beliefs relative to 
sensory evidence is controlled by the precision assigned to prediction errors at each level of 
the hierarchy (Friston, 2008). This balance may be atypical in autistic individuals, who may 
have a low precision of prior information relative to that of the sensory information (Friston 
                                                
1 The term ‘autistic person’ is the preferred language of many people on the spectrum (see 
Sinclair, 1999; Kenny, Hattersley, Molins, Buckley, 
Povey et al., 2016). In this article, we use this term as well as person-first language to respect 
the wishes of all individuals on the spectrum. 
 et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2014). Van de Cruys et al. (2014) made a more specific proposal 
that the precision of prediction errors is uniformly high and inflexible in individuals with 
autism. Finally, Sinha et al. (2014) proposed that individuals with autism have impairments in 
estimating the conditional probability of future events or states given a previous state 
occurring, particularly when the relationship between events is probabilistically weak, and/or 
when events are separated by long temporal intervals.  Yet, autistic individuals may excel at 
learning rules, due to heightened learning of novel stimuli (Sinha et al., 2014). 
If individuals with autism do not employ previous experience in the same way as 
typical individuals – either through weakened priors or atypical predictive mechanisms – they 
may behave differently in a task that involves tracking the statistics of the reward 
environment, such as that used by Behrens et al. (2007). No previous studies have assessed 
whether children with autism increase their learning rate in response to environmental 
volatility. Yet, reversal learning studies give insight into how individuals with autism deal 
with probabilistic information.  Most studies suggest that individuals with autism can learn 
initial reinforcement probabilities, but demonstrate difficulties in switching when these 
probabilities reverse (e.g., Solomon et al., 2011; South et al., 2012) or in maintaining new 
response probabilities (D’Cruz et al., 2013).  Such difficulties in reversal learning may reflect 
executive functioning deficits in autism (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; see Pellicano, 2012, 
for review). Yet, these studies do not address how higher-order statistics about the 
environment – such as volatility – affect the responses of individuals with autism.  
Robic et al. (2015) presented a cued decision-making task to 14 adults with autism 
and 15 neurotypical adults whilst manipulating the volatility of the environment (stable, 
unstable). A social cue (video of a human actor) or non-social cue (arrow) was presented 
before participants chose between one of two options, with both the reliability of the cue and 
the reward probabilities of each option being manipulated throughout the experiment. The 
 authors recorded the proportion of correct choices made by participants, and reported that 
fewer individuals with autism met a criterion of 60% correct than typical individuals when 
reward probabilities fluctuated (unstable condition), but not when reward probabilities were 
fixed (stable condition), and that individuals with autism performed particularly poorly in 
response to the social cue. The authors concluded that individuals with autism have particular 
difficulties in learning reward probabilities when the reward environment is unstable and 
involves a social aspect. Yet, importantly, half of the participants with autism did meet a 
criterion of 60% in the unstable condition, suggesting considerable individual differences in 
this performance metric. In this study, we used a more fine-grained measure to characterise 
behavioural responses to environmental volatility in autism. 
We administered a child-friendly version of Behrens et al.’s (2007) task to 34 children 
with autism, 32 typically developing children and 19 typical adults.  Participants were 
required to choose between two stimuli under two conditions: in the stable condition, the 
probability of each stimulus being rewarded was fixed. In the volatile condition, the 
probability of each stimulus being rewarded alternated every 20 trials. A crucial difference 
between this paradigm and those used in previous reversal learning studies in autism (e.g., 
Solomon et al., 2011; South et al., 2012; D’Cruz et al., 2013; Robic et al., 2015) was that 
each stimulus was associated with a reward value that varied trial-by-trial.  This paradigm 
allowed us to model the learning rates of participants (cf. Behrens et al., 2007), and in turn to 
address specific predictions derived from Bayesian and predictive coding accounts of autism.   
Pellicano and Burr (2012) suggested that individuals with autism are less influenced 
by information presented in the past, due to reduced priors. Van de Cruys et al. (2014) 
suggested that individuals with autism have very precise prediction errors, which would mean 
that they should heavily weight violations to their expectations and update their behaviour 
accordingly. Sinha et al. (2014) also predicted heightened learning to novel stimuli. Thus, 
 according to all these three accounts, children with autism may demonstrate a generally 
elevated learning rate, emphasising the outcomes of more recent trials (and thus, violations to 
their predictions) more than typical children. Van de Cruys et al. also made a further specific 
proposal that individuals with autism do not flexibly weight their prediction errors, which 
may mean that they do not modify their learning rate in the volatile condition compared to the 
stable condition to the same extent as typical individuals. 
Alongside these primary hypotheses, we were also interested in exploring possible 
relationships between task performance and anxiety.  Anxiety commonly co-occurs with 
autism (White et al., 2009), and high levels of trait anxiety have been linked to reduced 
updating of behaviour in response to volatility in an aversive version of Behrens et al.’s task 
(Browning et al., 2015). This link is particularly interesting given a suggestion that atypical 
predictive mechanisms may give rise to increased anxiety in autistic individuals (Sinha et al., 
2014). To this end, we investigated relationships between behaviour updating and parent-
reported anxiety in our children with and without autism.  
 
Materials and Methods  
Participants 
Three groups of participants were tested: 34 autistic children, 32 typically developing 
children and 19 typical adults (see Table 1 for participant characteristics).  The autistic 
children had previously received an independent clinical diagnosis of an autism spectrum 
condition according to ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) or DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria. Typically developing children had no parent-reported 
diagnoses of developmental conditions and typical adults reported no previous diagnoses of 
developmental conditions. Children’s parents completed the Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003) and children with autism were 
 administered the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-G or ADOS-2; Lord, 
Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 1999; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, Risi, Gotham et al., 2012) using the 
revised algorithm (Gotham, Risi, Pickles & Lord, 2007; Gotham, Risi, Dawson, Tager- 
Flusberg, Joseph et al., 2008). All autistic children scored above threshold for an autism 
spectrum condition on one or both of these measures and all typically developing children 
scored below the cut-off for autism on the SCQ (< 15; Rutter et al., 2003) (see Table 1 for 
scores). 
The groups of autistic and typical children were matched in terms of age, t(64) = 1.65, 
p = .10, performance IQ, t(64) = .17, p = .87 and full-scale IQ, t(58.78) = 1.33, p = .19, as 
assessed by the WechslerAbbreviated Scales of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II, 
Wechsler, 2011). The children with autism had lower verbal IQ scores than typical children, 
consistent with their clinical profile, t(56.17) = 2.21, p = .03. Anxiety was measured using the 
parent-report version of the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (SCAS-P; Nauta, Scholing, 
Rapee, Abbott, Spence et al., 2004), which was returned by 58 parents. The children with 
autism (n = 31) had significantly higher scores than typical children (n = 27), t(46.58) = 3.28, 
p = .002.  
Table 1. Participant characteristics 
 Children with autism Typically developing 
children 
Typical adults 
n 34 32 19 
Gender (n males : n females) 29 : 5 22 : 10 7 : 12 
Age (years; months)    
Mean (SD) 9;11 (2;0) 9;2 (1;10) 24;2 (3;9) 
Range 7;0 – 14;3 6;6 – 13;2 18;5 – 33;1 
Performance IQ     
Mean (SD) 105.44 (14.94) 104.84 (14.11)  
Range 79 – 141 78 – 131  
Verbal IQ    
Mean (SD) 100.15 (17.47) 108.03 (11.04)  
Range 71 – 130 86 – 132  
Full-scale IQ    
Mean (SD) 102.94 (15.46) 107.28 (10.66)  
Range 76 – 129 89 – 131  
SCQ score    
Mean (SD) 23.78 (7.35) 5.77 (4.04)  
Range 5 – 35 1 – 14  
 Intolerance to Uncertainty    
Mean (SD) 41.57 (11.42) 24.15 (10.13)  
Range 18 – 59 12 – 51  
Spence Children’s Anxiety    
Mean (SD) 33.52 (20.35) 19.78 (10.67)  
Range 6 – 76 6 – 43  
ADOS Total Score    
Mean (SD) 10.45 (4.64)   
Range 2 – 21   
Notes. SCQ = Social Communication Questionnaire (Rutter et al., 2003). ADOS = Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 1999, 2012); RRB = Restricted and repetitive behaviour. Verbal, 
Performance and Full-Scale IQ scores were derived from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence 
(WASI-II; Wechsler, 2011). 
 
Procedure 
This study was approved by the UCL Institute of Education’s Research Ethics 
Committee and conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Parents and adult participants gave their written informed consent and children provided their 
verbal assent prior to participation. 
We adapted Behrens et al.’s task into a child-friendly, pirate-themed game. The task 
began with an initial familiarisation phase, designed to introduce the participants to the task, 
followed by the experimental phase. Both phases were completed in a single session lasting 
approximately 15 minutes. Adult participants also completed a longer version of the 
experiment in a separate session lasting approximately 25 minutes (see below). Children and 
adults were seen individually in a quiet room. The WASI and ADOS were administered in 
further sessions. 
 
Familiarisation phase. 
Participants were initially introduced to images on cards showing two pirate chests, 
one green and one blue, each with a flag displaying a reward value between 0 and 100 points 
(or “coins”), with a combined total of 100 points (Fig. 1).  The experimenter explained to 
participants that only one chest would contain treasure on each trial (the rewarded stimulus); 
the other chest would be empty (the non-rewarded stimulus).  Critically, participants were 
 told that the chest containing treasure could change throughout the game.  Next, participants 
viewed 20 trials in which the chests were opened to reveal which chest was empty and which 
contained treasure (Fig. 1A). The ratio of the blue or green chest being rewarded was fixed at 
80:20.  Whether the blue or green chest was rewarded most often (i.e., 80% of the time) was 
randomised across participants. The values on the flags were randomly selected on each trial, 
with the constraint that the total number of points was always 100. After viewing all 20 trials, 
participants were asked to estimate the ratio to which the blue and green chests contained 
treasure, by moving a yellow indicator along a scale ranging from “All green” to “All blue” 
(Fig. 1B).  The familiarisation phase was repeated for participants who misunderstood the 
task (n = 4; e.g., those who responded that the treasure was always in the green chest when it 
was mostly blue, or vice versa).  
 
Figure 1. Familiarisation phase. (A) Example of a trial in the familiarisation phase, where 
participants passively viewed stimuli. (B) After viewing 20 trials, participants were asked to 
estimate the ratio to which the green or blue chest contained treasure. 
 
 Experimental phase. 
Immediately following the familiarisation phase, participants completed the 
experimental task. As in the familiarisation phase, participants were presented with a green 
and a blue pirate chest on each trial. Here, participants were required to actively choose either 
the green or blue pirate chest on each trial using response pads (Fig. 2). If participants chose 
the correct (rewarded) stimulus, the chest containing treasure was revealed, and they were 
awarded the number of points (or “coins”) indicated on the flag. Participants were given 
visual feedback (“Well done, you chose correctly!”) and auditory feedback (the sound of a 
coin dropping). The points were added to an accumulated total and displayed on a bar chart 
(Fig. 2). If participants chose the incorrect (non-rewarded) stimulus, an empty chest was 
revealed and participants did not receive any coins. Visual feedback was provided (“Better 
luck next time!”). When participants accumulated enough points to exceed the limits of the 
bar chart, they were shown a screen that told them they had reached the next “level” (e.g., 
“Congratulations, you are now a level 1 pirate!”). The bar chart was then emptied and 
participants accumulated points to reach the next level. 
During the task, the first 80 trials belonged to the stable condition, where the ratio of 
the blue or green response being rewarded was fixed at 75:25. The next 80 trials belonged to 
the volatile condition, whereby the ratio alternated between 80:20 and 20:80 every 20 trials.  
The conditions followed on from each other without a break and participants were naïve to 
the reward structure. At the end of the task, the participant’s total number of points (or 
“coins”) was displayed, along with the final “level” s/he had reached in the game (e.g., 
“Wow! You reached level 10 and collected 1500 coins!”).  
 
  
Figure 2. Experimental task. 
Experimental task. Example of a trial in the test phase in which the rewarded stimulus is the 
blue pirate chest. If the participant chose the green chest, an empty chest was revealed and no 
points were awarded. If the participant chose the blue chest, the treasure was revealed and the 
participant received the number of points (or ‘coins’) displayed on the flag (i.e. 27). 
 
Additional experiment for adult participants. 
The experimental task described above contained fewer trials than that used by 
Behrens et al. (2007) to make it suitable for child participants.  To allow direct comparisons 
with Behrens et al.’s original paradigm, adults also completed a longer version of the 
experiment, which included the same number of trials as presented by Behrens et al. The 
adults completed the longer version in a separate session after the short version, to ensure that 
the adults’ performance on the short version of the task was directly comparable to that of the 
children’s performance. In this longer version, the stable condition consisted of 120 trials 
with a fixed ratio of 75:25, and the volatile condition consisted of 170 trials with a ratio that 
switched between 80:20 and 20:80 every 30 or 40 trials (i.e., 30 – 40 – 30 – 40 – 30). The 
 order of stable and volatile conditions was counterbalanced in this task to confirm that the 
change in learning rate was not dependent on order of presentation (as originally 
demonstrated by Behrens et al.). 
 
Analysis. 
Prior to testing whether participants modulated their learning rates as a function of 
volatility, an initial analysis was performed to determine whether the participants’ behaviour 
could be reliably explained by the ideal Bayesian observer model, and whether this model 
was the best model to explain the participants’ behaviour in each group. We fitted each 
individual participant’s choices (green or blue) across all trials with a logistic generalized 
linear model. The design matrix contained a constant term and four different models: (i) 
ideal observer, (ii) alternating choices, (iii) win-stay loseshift, and (iv) reward value.  
The ideal observer regressor was estimated from the sequence of rewarded stimuli 
across all trials using the model described in Behrens et al. (2007). In short, optimal 
behaviour requires participants to estimate the probability of reward for each stimulus and to 
compute the expected value as reward probability multiplied by reward size. Given that the 
amplitude of the reward was random across trials, the ideal observer of the underlying 
probability of reward success is modelled only by the reward probabilities. In the task, the 
reward probability varies across trials and is dependent upon the volatility, which changes 
across the experiment. Therefore, the optimal observer relies on the parameter estimates of 
the reward probability, the volatility and the confidence in the volatility estimate from the 
preceding trial, and the latest trial outcome in order to determine decision and learning on the 
next trial.  
The alternating choices regressor tested whether participants simply switched between 
blue and green options on every consecutive trial. The win-stay lose-shift regressor modelled 
 whether the participant’s behaviour could be explained by them choosing the same option as 
the previous trial if that option had been rewarded, and choosing the opposite option if their 
response on the previous trial had not been rewarded. The reward value regressor was the 
reward value for the blue option. 
The main aim of this study was to test whether the different participant groups 
modulated their learning rate based on the volatility of the environment. To this end we 
estimated the learning rate for each participant in the stable and volatile conditions of the 
task. For the shorter version of the task the learning rate was estimated using the 61 trials 
from trial 20 to trial 80 in the stable condition, and the 61 trials from trial 90 to trial 150 in 
the volatile condition. For the longer version of the task, the corresponding windows were the 
last 81 trials of each of the stable and volatile phases, following Behrens et al. (2007). A 
reinforcement-learning model was fitted to each participant’s decisions in each window. The 
model has two parts: a ‘predictor’, which estimates the current reward rate given past 
observations, and a ‘selector’, which generates actions on the basis of these estimates. The 
predictor is in the form of a simple deltalearning rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), which has 
a single free parameter: the learning rate. 
Results 
Figure 3 shows the mean choices made by each group (upper panel) and the ideal observer 
model (lower panel). The ideal observer model provided the best fit to the data in all groups, 
compared to the alternating choices, win-stay lose-shift and reward value models (Figure 
4A). The ideal observer model provided a significant fit (p < .05) to the choices from the 
majority of participants in all groups (Figure 4B). We used chisquared tests to determine 
whether the proportion of participants fit by each model varied (i) between child participants 
and adults, and (ii) between autistic and typically developing children. The only significant 
difference was that more child participants were fit by the win-stay lose-shift model than 
 adults, v2(1) = 5.77, p = .02. All other comparisons between children and adult participants 
were non-significant, ps ≥ .68, and there were no significant differences in the proportions of 
autistic versus typically developing children fit by each model, ps ≥ .23. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean performance of ideal and real observers 
Mean performance of ideal and real observers. The upper panel shows the mean choices ±1 
standard error of the mean made by autistic children (green), typically developing (TD) 
children (red) and adults (blue). The lower panel shows mean ideal observer performance ±1 
SEM based on the reward probabilities and values presented to all participants. The dotted 
lines represent the underlying reward probabilities. Trials 1–80 belong to the stable condition, 
in which the reward probability is fixed at 75:25. Trials 81–160 belong to the volatile 
condition, in which the reward probability fluctuates between 80:20 and 20:80 every 20 trials. 
The probability of choice refers to the probability of choosing the option that was most 
frequently rewarded in the initial stable condition (which was counterbalanced among 
participants to be either the blue or green pirate chest). Boxes represent the window of trials 
over which learning rates were estimated for each individual. 
 
 
Having demonstrated that the ideal observer model provided the best fit to the data, 
we next assessed the resulting learning rate estimate. First, we analysed the data from the 
adult participants on the long version of the experiment (Figure 5) to ensure that we could 
replicate Behrens et al.’s (2007) pattern of results. All learning rates were log-transformed 
prior to analysis meet the assumption of normality required for general linear models.2 A 
 mixed-design ANOVA with condition (stable, volatile) as a within-participants factor and 
order of presentation (stable first, volatile first) as a between participants factor confirmed 
that participants increased their learning rate in the volatile condition, F(1, 17) = 51.86, p < 
.001, np2 = .75. In line with Behrens et al., the order of presentation did not have a significant 
effect on learning rate estimates, F(1, 17) = .91, p = .35, and did not interact with condition, 
F(1, 17) = 2.54, p = .13. Thus, participants had a higher learning rate in the volatile condition 
than the stable condition even when the volatile condition was presented first. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of model fitting to participant data 
 (A) Mean t-statistic of fit for four models to the data of autistic children (green), typically 
developing (TD) children (red), and typical adults (blue): (1) an ideal observer model, (2) a 
model which alternates between responses trial-by-trial, (3) a win-stay lose-shift model 
(maintaining responses after successes and switching responses after failures), and (4) a 
model based on the reward value. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. (B) 
Proportion of participants in each group whose data were significantly fit with each of the 
four models (p < .05).). 
 
  
.  
 
 
Figure 5. Learning rates of adult observers. 
Estimated learning rates of adult observers as a function of the order in which stable and 
volatile conditions were presented (left panel) and the length of the testing session (right 
panel). Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean.). 
 
 
Next, we compared the adults’ learning rates in the short and long versions of the 
experiment (Figure 5) using a within-participants ANOVA with condition (stable, volatile) 
and length of session (short, long) as factors. Again, we found an overall effect of condition, 
F(1, 18) = 54.81, p < .001, np2 = .75, whereby participants increased their learning rate in the 
volatile condition. In addition, there was an effect of length, with higher learning rates 
obtained in the long version of the experiment than the short version, F(1, 18) = 24.87, p < 
.001, np2 = .58. These effects were qualified with an interaction between condition and length, 
F(1, 18) = 19.21, p < .001, np2 = .52. While the increase in learning rate was more 
pronounced in the long version, post hoc t-tests confirmed that the learning rate increased in 
both the short, t(18) = 3.40, p = .003, and long version of the experiment, t(18) = 8.04, p < 
.001. While it is not possible to determine whether the elevated learning rates in the long 
condition are a result of the increased number of trials, or increased familiarity with the task 
 (as the long condition was presented after the short version), we have established that a clear 
effect of volatility is present with a reduced number of trials in adult participants. 
 
 
Fig 6. Learning rates in the stable and volatile conditions 
Learning rates in the stable and volatile conditions. Estimated learning rates in the stable and 
volatile conditions for autistic children (green), typically developing (TD) children 
(red) and typical adults (blue). Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
 
Next, we aimed to assess whether typically developing children and autistic children 
increased their learning rate as a function of volatility, in the same way as adults. Learning 
rates for the three groups are shown in Figure 6. As above, log-transformed learning rates 
were used in the analysis. A mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on learning rate estimates 
with condition (stable, volatile) as a within-participants variable and group (children with 
autism, typical children, and typical adults) as a between-participants variable. As expected, 
there was a main effect of condition, with higher learning rates in the volatile condition than 
the stable condition, F(1, 82) = 32.52, p < .001, np2 = .28. Unexpectedly, however, there was 
neither a significant effect of group, F(2, 82) = .02, p = .98, np2 < .001, nor a significant 
 
 
 interaction between group and condition, F(2, 82) = .22, p = .81, np2 = .005. Thus, all groups 
increased their learning rate in the volatile condition to a similar extent. 
In order to judge the extent of a potential undetected effect, we compared the 
difference in log learning rates in the stable and volatile conditions between autistic and 
typical children, and found that the 95% confidence intervals of the group difference were 
tightly distributed around zero [±.03, .02]. Learning rates were not related to age, 
performance IQ or verbal IQ (all ps ≥ .39). Similarly, the difference in learning rates between 
the conditions was unrelated to age and ability (ps ≥ .58). To investigate whether increased 
anxiety (as rated by parents) is related to reduced updating in the volatile condition (cf. 
Browning et al., 2015), we investigated the relationship between scores on the SCAS-P and 
the difference in learning rates between the volatile and stable conditions for each participant. 
Parent ratings were not related to difference scores, r = .12, p = .35, nor to learning rates in 
either the stable or the volatile condition (ps ≥ .15). 
In order to align our paradigm with previous studies of reversal learning in autism (cf. 
D’Cruz et al., 2013; Solomon et al., 2011; Robic et al., 2015), we investigated whether the 
autistic children could learn new reward probabilities as quickly as typically developing 
individuals. We calculated a running average of choices made by each participant over four 
consecutive trials, and fitted regression lines to the first ten running averages after the reward 
probabilities switched (i.e. trials 101–110, 121– 130, and 141–150). The mean regression 
slopes for each group are shown in Figure 7. We applied a square-root transformation to the 
absolute slope coefficients in each condition in order to meet the normality assumption 
required for an ANOVA (Shapiro-Wilk test, ps ≥ .06).2 Next, we conducted a mixed-design 
ANOVA on the transformed absolute slope coefficients with trial interval (101–110, 121–
130, 141–150) as the within-participants factor, and group (autism, TD, adult) as the 
between-participants factor. Mauchly’s test demonstrated that sphericity could be assumed, 
 v2(2) = 3.91, p = .14. There was a significant within participants effect of trial interval on 
slope coefficients, F(2, 164) = 8.57, p < .001, np2 = .10.3 Repeated contrasts revealed that the 
slopes in the first interval (trials 101– 110) were approximately as steep as slopes in the 
second interval (trials 121–130), F(1, 82) = 3.54, p = .06, np2 = .04, while slopes in the third 
interval (trials 141–150) were significantly steeper than those in the second interval, F(1, 82) 
= 16.16, p < .001, np2 = .17. Importantly, however, there was no overall group difference 
in slope coefficients, F(2, 82) = 2.82, p = .07, np2 = .06, nor an interaction between trial 
interval and group, F(4, 164) = .52, p = .72. 
Figure 7. Gradients of regression lines fitted to participant choices after a switch in 
reward values. 
Mean regression slopes (±1 standard error of the mean) for the running average of four 
consecutive choices made by autistic children (green), typically developing (TD) children 
(red) and adults (blue) in the first 10 trials after the reward probabilities switched. For 
example, if the reward probability for the blue to the green chest switched from 80:20 to 
20:80 at trial 100, participants became less likely to choose the blue chest (i.e. a negative 
slope). When the reward probability reversed again at trial 120, the participants became more 
likely to choose the blue chest (i.e. a positive slope). 
 
 
  
Discussion 
 In this study, children with autism, typical children and typical adults completed a 
decision-making task under. two probabilistic reward schedules: a stable condition where the 
reward probabilities were fixed, and a volatile condition where the reward probabilities 
fluctuated. Based on recent Bayesian and predictive coding accounts of autism, we predicted 
that autistic children would assign more weighting to the outcome of recent trials than typical 
children and adults, and that they would not flexibly update their behaviour in response to 
volatility. 
In our task, these predictions would be manifest, respectively, as an increased learning 
rate compared to typical children, and a reduced tendency to increase their learning rate in the 
volatile condition. Contrary to these predictions, we found that children with autism 
hadsimilar learning rate to typical children and adults overall, and that they modified their 
learning rate to a similar extent as typical children and adults.  
These results appear to be at odds with Bayesian and predictive coding accounts of 
autism. Children with autism employed the recent history of trial outcomes in a similar way 
to typical children, contrasting both Pellicano and Burr’s (2012a) hypothesis of reduced use 
of priors in autism, and Van de Cruys et al.’s (2014) suggestion of highly precise prediction 
errors in autism, meaning that violations to expectations should be heavily weighted (see also 
Sinha et al., 2014). Furthermore, the children with autism were able to flexibly weight their 
prediction errors in order to update their learning rate in response to environmental volatility 
(cf. Van de Cruys et al., 2014). Why, then, do we find no differences in performance? 
To date, Bayesian predictive models have arguably had most success in explaining 
how individuals with autism process sensory information. For example, these accounts have 
been linked to reports of reduced adaptation to high-level sensory attributes, such as faces 
 (Ewing, Pellicano & Rhodes, 2013; Fiorentini, Gray, Rhodes, Jeffery & Pellicano, 2012; 
Pellicano, Jeffery, Burr & Rhodes, 2007; Pellicano, Rhodes & Calder, 2013; Rutherford, 
Troubridg & Walsh, 2012; but see also Cook, Brewer, Shah & Bird, 2014) and numerosity 
(Turi, Burr, Igliozzi, Aagten-Murphy, Muratori et al., 2015), as well as reduced use of 
contextual information in the rubber-hand illusion (Palmer, Paton, Kirkovski, Enticott 
& Hohwy, 2015) and reduced filtering of signal-fromnoise in motion displays (Manning, 
Tibber, Charman, Dakin & Pellicano, 2015; Zaidel, Goin-Kochel & Angelaki, 
2015). Thus, it is conceivable that atypical predictive mechanisms account for perception in 
autism, but may not extend to learning tasks, as in the current study. This proposal may not 
be too surprising, given that sensory symptoms are a core feature of the autistic phenotype 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), while general difficulties in learning have not 
been established (see Dawson, Mottron & Gernsbacher, 2008, for review). Indeed, previous 
research has suggested that individuals with autism learn reward probabilities as well as 
typical individuals in simple learning tasks (D’Cruz et al., 2013; Faja, Murias, Beauchaine & 
Dawson, 2013; Solomon et al., 2011), perform successfully in implicit learning tasks (Brown, 
Aczel, Jim enez, Kaufman & Plaisted- Grant, 2010; Nemeth, Janacsek, Balogh, Londe, 
Mingesz et al., 2010; Foti, De Crescenzo, Vivanti, Menghini & Vicari, 2015), and even 
demonstrate enhanced visual statistical learning (Roser, Aslin, McKenzie, Zahra & 
Fiser, 2015). 
Yet, differences between children with autism and typical children may become 
apparent using more complex learning tasks. For example, Pellicano, Smith, Cristino, Hood, 
Briscoe et al. (2011) showed that children with autism were slower than typical children to 
learn reward probabilities in a large-scale foraging task, which required children to 
continuously update their spatial representations while remembering what locations 
 they had already searched. Social situations may also pose particularly pronounced predictive 
processing challenges for autistic people (Gomot & Wicker, 2012; Lawson et al., 2014), as 
there is no simple one-to-one mapping between a cause and the sensory input. Thus, 
differences may well arise in a social version of our learning task (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich 
& Rushworth, 2008). In such a task, autistic children may demonstrate difficulties in tracking 
the probability that a confederate would give the correct advice. Preliminary support for this 
suggestion comes from a recent study demonstrating reduced use of social information during 
a similar decision-making task in typical people with high levels of autistic traits (Sevgi, 
Diaconescu, Tittgemeyer & Schilbach, 2016), although this will require replication in 
participants with a clinical diagnosis of autism. Predictive coding accounts have been 
proposed to explain a range of high-level social abilities that may be affected in autism, such 
as theory of mind (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013), interpersonal inference (Moutoussis, Fearon, 
El-Deredy, Dolan & Friston, 2014) and interoception (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014; Seth, 
Suzuki & Critchley, 2011). Thus, further studies are required to probe the limits of atypical 
predictive processing in autism, and theoretical accounts will need to be updated to account 
for these. In particular, differences between children with autism and typical children may be 
manifest in more complex situations where the one-to-one mapping between events is even 
less clear, when higher levels of the predictive coding hierarchy are required (see also 
Qian & Lipkin, 2011). While our task was the ideal candidate for assessing decision-making 
in an uncertain environment (Van de Cruys et al., 2014), it might not have been sufficiently 
challenging to reveal differences between children with and without autism. 
A previous study with adults showed that anxious traits were related to reduced 
updating of behaviour in an aversive version of the task, in which incorrect responses were 
followed by electric shocks (Browning et al., 2015). In this study, we did not find a 
relationship between levels of parent-reported trait anxiety and task performance. Yet, the 
 children with autism were reported by their parents to have elevated levels of anxiety overall. 
Thus, even those children with high levels of anxiety were able to update their behaviour to 
environmental volatility in a typical fashion. The lack of the predicted relationship may have 
been because we did not use an aversive reinforcer in this task, unlike Browning et al. Future 
research could investigate relationships between task performance and child-reported anxiety, 
or measures of state anxiety (e.g. heart rate, saliva cortisol levels). 
As well as addressing specific proposals from Bayesian predictive coding models, our 
results add more generally to the reward learning literature in autism. Previous studies have 
revealed subtle differences in reversal learning between individuals with and without 
autism.For example, D’Cruz et al. (2013) reported that individuals with autism needed more 
trials to achieve a criterion of 8 correct out of 10 consecutive responses after a switch, and 
were more likely to return to the previously reinforced response after having selected the new 
correct choice. Robic et al. (2015) reported that fewer autistic individuals reached a criterion 
of 60% correct than typical individuals when reward probabilities fluctuated, and that autistic 
individuals were more likely to maintain their response after a failure than typical 
individuals.Furthermore, Solomon et al. (2011) reported that individuals with autism were 
less likely to maintain their response after a success, and Solomon, Frank, Ragland, Smith, 
Niendam et al. (2015) reported selective difficulties with learning high-probability pairings 
but not lower-probability pairings. The participants involved in the current study differed 
substantially from those tested by Robic et al. (2015) and Solomon et al. (2011, 2015), who 
tested adult participants, and D’Cruz et al. (2013), who tested participants of a wide age range 
(between 8 and 44 years). However, it is worth noting that the current paradigm is not 
directly comparable to these previous studies which did not manipulate the reward value. It 
does not make sense to assess the proportion correct in this study in the same way as in these 
 previous studies, as on a given trial, the optimal choice may not have been the same as the 
most frequently rewarded choice. However, the children with autism appeared to 
change their behaviour just as quickly as typical children and adults after a switch in the 
current experiment. 
The discrepancy between the current study and previous studies of reversal learning 
raise the intriguing possibility that a certain amount of environmental volatility may actually 
help children to adapt to new situations. Previous studies of reversal learning in autism have 
been unable to dissociate whether difficulties changing responses after a switch result from 
slower switching per se, or from individuals with autism building a more stable state prior to 
the switch. When there is no reward value information, the optimal strategy is to consistently 
choose the option with the highest reward probability. Under these conditions, individuals 
with autism may reach a very stable state, which means that they will need more evidence to 
reject their current model and shift to a new model. Yet, the addition of randomly fluctuating 
reward value information, as in our paradigm, may prevent children with autism getting into 
such a stable initial state. Thus, it is possible that reward value fluctuations in the stable 
condition help children with autism to deal with the bigger change that occurs when they 
move into the volatile phase of the experiment. While speculative, this may suggest that some 
divergence from routines may be beneficial to autistic children in adapting to everyday 
situations. To investigate this possibility further, it will be important to compare different 
learning paradigms in the same samples of participants. 
In sum, our study shows that children with andwithout autism can learn about the 
statistics of the reward environment in a similar way to typical adults, by updating their 
learning rate when the environment becomes volatile. The typical performance of children 
with autism contrasts hypotheses emerging from recent Bayesian and predictive coding 
accounts of autism. While we believe that there is much mileage in these approaches, they 
 need to be explicitly laid out in order to make clear predictions from behavioural studies. Van 
de Cruys et al. (2014) made one such prediction: ‘We predict that things will go awry in ASD 
[autism spectrum disorder] when the probabilistic structure changes during the experiment, 
for instance when the predictability of a cue changes across blocks’ (p. 655). Our results do 
not support this prediction and argue against the suggestion that precision is set uniformly 
high in individuals with autism. Bayesian and predictive coding accounts may be best suited 
to explaining atypical sensation and perception in autism, and may not generalize to learning 
tasks. Yet, future research is needed in order to determine whether atypical predictive 
processing may be apparent for more complex learning tasks, such as those requiring 
individuals with autism to learn about social aspects of the environment. Further insights into 
learning mechanisms in autism may be gleaned by using implicit measures (e.g. eyetracking 
or neuroimaging) in conjunction with our behavioural task. 
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